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The Crucible of Crisis:  Three Presidents Confront the Perfect 
Storm 
  





This article based on interviews with the presidents of Dillard and Xavier Universities and 
Tougaloo College examines their leadership in response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005.  The ways 
they led their communities reveal both points of commonality and discrete leadership styles and 
approaches. Their experiences and those of their institutions can inform views of the college 
presidency, especially in times of crisis and challenge. 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
n late summer 2005,  young adults around the country made their annual pilgrimage to 
college campuses as beginning or returning students. Included in this pilgrimage were 
students attending colleges and universities in New Orleans and in other parts of the 
South near the Gulf Coast while Hurricane Katrina was brewing nearby.  Within days this 
“perfect storm” was to wreak havoc over much of this coastal area with heavy winds and 
rain, changing the face of New Orleans and the campuses of the city and casting its 
effects well inland. Three colleges and universities were among the institutions and areas 
of residence, culture, and life in the path of the storm, and the leadership of the presidents 
of these schools was tested by the resulting crisis that confronted these campus 
communities   
The college presidency is a complex and challenging leadership position in the 
eyes of both higher education institutions and society.  The de rigueur responsibilities 
and expectations of the office and of the individuals who hold these esteemed posts are 
decidedly demanding and difficult. When a major disaster or crisis comes on the scene 
and is added to the mix, the life of a president can and does change dramatically and in a 
heartbeat.  The pressures to lead communities comprised of greatly diverse individuals, 
personalities, and groups—professors, students, staff, alumni, trustees, and other core 
supporters—to navigate through internal and external criticisms; to shape the profile of 
faculty members and the academic life; to raise money; and to manage public relations 
matters often force these leaders to exceed normally perceived human capacities. The 
tragedy at Virginia Tech, and the microscope of scrutiny placed on its president and 
members of his cabinet and key administrative personnel, is one of the more recent 
examples of public expectations about credibility and the small margin for error that 
these leaders cope with in handling crisis situations.  
                                                     
Stephen J. Nelson is assistant professor, Educational Leadership, Bridgewater State College; senior 
scholar, Leadership Alliance, Brown University; and  author of the recently published Leaders in the 
Labyrinth: College Presidents and the Battleground of Creeds and Convictions. Dillard and Xavier 
Universities are members of the Alliance. 
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Three presidents of schools in New Orleans and the nearby Mississippi coast—
Marvelene Hughes at Dillard and  Norman Francis at Xavier Universities, and Beverly 
Hogan at Tougaloo College—found themselves literally in the eye of the storm and as 
focal points of their campus communities as they sought to cope with the damage and 
disaster that befell them. This article focuses on the presidents of these three historically 
black (HBCUs) colleges and universities1 because even in normal times these black 
institutions often confront vastly greater economic challenges than their traditionally 
greater endowed white counterparts. In short, Xavier, Tougaloo, and Dillard are not 
institutions with a great deal of cushion against external pressures, especially those 
exerted outside their control, as was the case with the devastating effects of Hurricane 
Katrina. It is also important to examine a snapshot of these leaders whose schools are 
normally not as much in the public view as others perceived as more prestigious.   
These three presidents faced struggles and displayed élan in this time of crisis in 
ways that deserve attention. Their leadership, and the lessons drawn from it, can inform a 
broad audience.  How do presidents, or other leaders for that matter, function at moments 
such as this? What might be learned about leadership from their experiences in the 
crucible of this disaster? What is suggested by the manner in which these presidents 
confronted the realities of crisis while their institutions faced a precarious future?  Are the 
individual reserves on which they drew and the lessons they crafted ones applicable and 
informative for other leaders facing similar circumstances or are they applicable and 
informative merely for those who conduct normal day-to-day operations of the 
presidency?   
An examination of the ways these three presidents led their communities reveals 
both points of commonality, and also unique and discrete leadership styles and 
approaches.  Each had to find ways to deal with the economic, human, and physical plant 
impacts of the hurricane, and to navigate plans for the future in the face of questions 
about sheer survival.  Their ensuing experiences and that of their institutions can inform 
views of the college and university presidency, especially in times of crisis and challenge.  
We turn then to these unique perspectives about leadership, and the ways Presidents 
Francis, Hughes, and Hogan weathered these challenges and created pathways to 
construct and shape their institutions as they rebounded for the future.   
We will concentrate on three overarching elements. The first is the initial 
reactions to the disaster framed by instinctive responses and efforts to ensure the safety 
and security of people—with special concern directed toward students, the young people 
trusted to the care of these institutions, but also to the faculty and staff who make these 
colleges run. The second is the assessment of damage, its implications for their 
institutions’ futures, the decisions that ensued for interim planning and a return to a 
semblance of “normal,” and the steps essential for longer term rebuilding. The last and 
most important element we examine consists of the principles and values undergirding 
their leadership. Revelatory in this instance are postures rooted in the rudders and 
compasses that each president possessed and from which they exercised leadership.  It is 
not a stretch to comprehend these qualities as being constituted as “faith,” bordering on 
and including religious beliefs. It is clear that each relied on characteristics beyond 
normally revealed understandings about how leaders cope with crises and with the 
expectations and demands on them in such moments.     




An initial theme these presidents note and that arises in their accounts of the 
circumstances they faced is the necessity in crisis situations  to operate  on a leadership 
version of autopilot.2  The evidence they present is striking in the similarities among 
them. They instantly realized that they were confronting circumstances for which there 
was no real preparation. Their reaction, critical as it was human, required tapping into 
inner resources as days turned into months of fallout from the disaster and turning 
attention to what would need to be done in response and recovery.   
But this fact alone, unsurprising as it is, tells only part of the story. The other and 
more important questions raised are: how do leaders function when on autopilot, when 
they are forced to react to events viscerally and instinctively? What do leaders draw upon 
in situations such as this?  What are sources of guidance and of inspiration?  How do they 
act sufficiently wisely to address the challenges of the circumstances they are forced to 
encounter?  If the argument is that specific leaders may have the “right stuff,” we still 
need to inquire further about what are those elements of character that serve to produce 
good outcomes.  What elements would constitute the content underlying any conclusions 
that a leader led well? 
For example, President Hogan portrays the nature of her initial responses to the 
damage at Tougaloo College as a situation in which you have “No script.  You do things 
by instinct.”3  As she surveyed the state of her campus, she was already thinking about 
the broader context of her work and the stake in it presumably shared by colleagues.  This 
reaction about the importance of functioning closely with colleagues and of being willing 
to get one’s own hands dirty is one of Hogan’s recurrent messages, one shared by these 
two other presidents. It could be argued that this task of working side-by-side with 
colleagues is something a good leader should do all the time. While true, it is even more 
critical that this lesson not be forgotten or neglected in times of crisis.  It is clear that this 
navigating principle was fundamental to the ways these three presidents shaped the 
pathways that needed to be constructed as they dealt with the hurricane and its aftermath. 
Despite the chaos of the early stages of the hurricane’s fallout, as well as in the 
days and weeks that followed, these presidents exerted a clear focus on the human 
aspects of the unfolding drama.  It was people, especially students but also staff and 
faculty and their well-being and morale, not the buildings, bricks and mortar and the 
other physical, structural, and facilities concerns that quickly formed the core of each 
president’s attention and decisions.  The presidents independently indicate that the 
immediate safety and security of students were the pressing major concerns.  Decisions 
needed to be made about whether students would remain on campus or that evacuations 
would be in the offing or forced by circumstances.   
In addition, given the less than fully publicly coordinated and often individualized 
exodus of personnel and citizens from New Orleans, it was critical for the presidents 
there to know the status of faculty and staff, where they were being forced to go, and the 
degree to which they would be available in person or at a distance to assist with decision-
making and planning. Reliance on human resources became paramount, despite the 
professional and personal travails experienced by college and university employees, 
especially those who were citizens of New Orleans.  The presidents shared with key staff 
and faculty the ominous reports about the gathering threat to their homes while at the 
same time dealing with immediate personal concerns.  Particularly for President Francis 




the issues that he personally faced as he provided leadership to the university led to a 
number of stunningly poignant situations that provide a further behind-the-scenes view. 
Francis confirms that in the opening hours of the storm, everything looked fine.4  
He notes that Xavier University had experienced major hurricane threats in previous 
years.  As part of their preparation for hurricane events, Xavier had to set up a “war 
room” to enable campus leaders to remain on campus at least as storms developed and to 
have access to secure communications and other management tools essential for coping 
with an approaching disaster. Earlier when a storm appeared to be developing, Francis 
had gone to the war room and utilized its accommodations as a meeting space for about 
ten of the university’s key leaders. While waiting for the advance of the storm, he 
remarked that he would remain on campus.  As it turned out, nothing happened.  
Later, when Katrina began to strike the coast, Francis initially went through the 
same drill, gathering his core staff in the designated crisis center and preparing to use this 
arrangement to make decisions, implement protocols, and develop necessary plans to deal 
with the situation.  The Mayor of New Orleans and the Governor of Louisiana began to 
urge, though not yet order, evacuation. Despite the fact that the actual order to evacuate 
came later than might have been ideal, Xavier got almost everyone out.  However, at this 
point about 200 students who were not evacuated remained on campus, and about forty 
faculty members and staff people were either on campus or in their homes nearby.   
Given the public orders, Francis decided to move to temporary headquarters in a 
downtown hotel rather than remain on campus as he had in the case of the previous 
threatened storm. When Katrina came and went without major damage, many in New 
Orleans, Francis and his staff included, thought they might have dodged a bullet. 
But then the levees broke during the night, and water was now in the streets.  
Francis reports that the “city began to lose communications,” and as a result of his being 
at the hotel location, he was  becoming “out of touch with the university” still staffed as it 
was by those who had remained on campus. Francis was forced to leave with other guests 
and more city residents as the hotel was cleared out while the water rose.  He first “had to 
walk in three to four feet of water to drive to another hotel,” only then to depart the city 
by bus for Baton Rouge. 
He decided to set up preliminary headquarters in a small town outside Baton 
Rouge where some of his extended family lived.  At this point he was “able to get contact 
with staff and students on campus for their evacuation,” negotiating arrangements to get 
them out of the city. Despite the grave conditions of rising water, one of the campus 
dining services was located along with the student and other residents on sufficiently high 
ground and had been able as a result of an emergency power source to continue 
functioning and producing meals.  But now those remaining on campus had to flee the 
city environs in the not-so-well organized citywide evacuation that was underway.  From 
his now off-site location, Francis and his staff were able to procure buses that would 
transport this final group of two hundred Xavier students first to Grambling and Southern 
Universities, and then from there they would subsequently travel to their homes. 
Addressing the needs of members of their campus communities was an initial 
pattern of response for all three institutions and their leaders.  The first goal was to keep 
students safe and, even if they were to remain on campus temporarily, in as good shape as 
possible. Coupled with this response was the need to support, maintain, and use as 




effectively as possible the personnel, the human resources of the college.  At each of the 
three schools, students had to leave the campus—Xavier and Dillard because water 
inundated the property. They were then forced to be away for slightly longer than the 
remainder of the semester, due to the extent of damage these two campuses suffered.  At 
Tougaloo because power to the campus along with the surrounding city of Jackson was 
cutoff, students were forced to leave their residence halls, though were able to return in 
about a week when power was restored.  Hogan was able to remain in the President’s 
House, which became a headquarters from which to supervise and coordinate staff 
regarding the initial clean up and more long range needs that the storm created for the 
campus.   
At Xavier and Dillard the full awareness and confrontation about the degree of 
damage seeped in over time.  Because Presidents Francis and Hughes immediately had to 
leave their campuses and in short order move out of the city and region, both collected 
most of their knowledge about the state of their campuses from news reports and video 
footage of the disaster.  They shared helplessness with fellow New Orleans’s citizens, 
and gathered a picture of the disaster with the rest of the country from the rapid and 
suddenly incessant national coverage. In Francis’s case, aware that his home was 
undoubtedly inundated, his first view of the damage was from an Internet satellite view 
of the neighborhood.  On the screen he and his wife were able to identify their property 
by what they could see of a surrounding seven-foot high brick wall, now with only the 
top of the wall showing and only in certain places.  Realizing that this meant their home 
was flooded by seven feet or more of water, Francis remarked that there was nothing they 
could do about it, that they would get to that problem in time (it was weeks later before 
they were even able to visit the property to survey the damage), and that there were more 
pressing concerns for the university and the city.   
This evidence of personal and professional élan is at the heart of this story.  
Francis reports his experience almost matter-of-factly, possibly a result of the passage of 
time.5  But it appears that his approach is widely shared by fellow presidents, including 
Scott Cowen, President of Tulane University.  There is a remarkable degree to which they 
all at the time felt detachment from immediate personal concerns and were able to exert 
professional focus on the tasks at hand as the manner through which they coped with the 
overwhelming realities they faced.6  Francis seconds Hogan’s notion about the reliance 
on instinct.  He characterizes this as being “driven by adrenaline that said we [Xavier] 
had come too far and done too much to let Katrina take us down,” adding and quoting 
President Hughes, “We were on our knees but we were not on our backs.”7 
“Courage” may be an overused word to characterize leadership. But courage is 
apt in the instance of these presidents. Their voices are permeated with such affirmations, 
words that capture a personal response. For each of these presidents, the interplay of 
personal belief that a way forward through the crisis would be found coupled with firm 
yet flexible leadership style was a strong determinant of their core assertions about both 
the short run decisions and management of the crisis they and their institutions faced, as 
well as the longer-term issues that had to be addressed. In many ways this latter aspect of 
what has come to be required is even more difficult because of the energy needed to 
sustain leadership momentum and commitment for the longer haul. The challenge to 
maintain a personal conviction and hope that disaster can be overcome while providing 




realistic leadership about the prospects for their communities continues two years after 
the storm and likely will continue into the foreseeable future. The manner in which these 
presidents have successfully faced this challenge and maintained the faith of their 
constituents confirms the courage of their leadership. 
Like Francis, President Hughes quickly moved to confront the situation at Dillard 
wrought by the development of the hurricane. Hughes began her presidency at the 
university less than two months before Katrina struck. Prior to this appointment she had 
had an extensive career in academic administration, including serving as the President of 
California State University since 1994.   
She could easily have “retired” from the presidency when she left that position.  
But she found herself drawn to Dillard and its presidential post, and unabashedly 
describes the attraction as a “calling” that led her to the university.8  Hughes had spent 
her first weeks on campus becoming acquainted with the university, the community in 
and outside the gates, and the students.  Because the first year students had arrived about 
a week before the hurricane struck, followed by their upper class counterparts, Hughes 
had had at least some opportunity to greet and meet them. They were taking the first steps 
in becoming a new community.   
Hughes was on a retreat with Dillard’s senior administrative cabinet when the 
storm began.  It was from there that she began the process that would lead, as at Xavier, 
to the evacuation of the campus and to a crisis that she describes in language almost 
identical to President Hogan as having “never experienced anything so surreal.”9  She 
quickly returned to campus to make plans to shut down the university. Evacuating herself 
after overseeing the immediate emergency plans to fashion the departure of the students, 
Hughes, like Francis, went first to a secure place off campus and shortly thereafter moved 
to Atlanta to establish the university’s “new” headquarters with senior staff.   
Like her colleagues she comments that it was “so unfathomable, left watching and 
seeing it unfold, though [at the time] not knowing the impact to the campus.”  The 
media’s “attention was so focused on the Convention Center and the Dome,” where 
thousands of residents were stranded, that other features of the city such as the Dillard 
campus were simply being overlooked. Hughes was able by helicopter to get an “aerial 
view of the campus from which she was able to see only a lake of water 8-10 feet.”10  It 
was at this point that the full awareness of the “massive reality [she had] to deal with” 
now confronted her and her administrative group, and the Dillard community. 
During the period of these opening days of the crisis for Dillard, Hughes recalls 
that her major task, and great challenge given the disruption to normal power, electronic 
devices, and computer and internet capacity, was “to communicate with the campus 
community, the faculty and staff,” and that at that time her personal and human “reserves 
were focused on the people rather than the place.”  The immediate decision being forced 
by the total flood of the campus and its facilities was that she and her staff would have to 
relocate.  By the second week she had made the move “to Atlanta as a command site with 
a team.”  The good news and a tribute to the advanced planning that Dillard, like Xavier, 
had exercised was that the “emergency procedures had worked and that everyone was 
safe.”11   
Exerting her leadership and organizational capacity, Hughes reports that the 
“emergency planning team” that she had relied on while on campus “was [now] no longer 




an evacuation team, but a planning team” to which she added “insurance companies, and 
Board members.”12  She also had the good fortune to have a former FEMA member as 
part of group. It was at this point that any hope that might have been evidenced 
previously about any early return of students and others to the campus and resumption of 
the academic year was simply not going to happen in anything like the short run.   
As Hughes and Dillard communicated with students, one bridge they had to cross, 
as Francis likewise had to with the Xavier community, was the “reality that they could 
not return in the fall.” But Hughes also was clear in telling students that she “wanted 
them to remain on course” despite the inability for Dillard to offer classes and residence 
on a normal basis. Many of the students had already begun to register elsewhere for the 
fall term. Thus the coordination of these temporary transfers, the necessary collaboration 
with colleague institutions, and the development of fair requirements for maintaining 
status with the “home” college became technical matters that Francis and Hughes (along 
with Cowen and other New Orleans campus leaders) had to address.  Decisions regarding 
their status also had to be communicated clearly to students and to the other colleges and 
universities that came to be involved as they temporarily accepted students from Dillard, 
Xavier, Tulane, as well as other New Orleans students.  Guiding these transitions became 
one more leadership demand on Hughes and her team, and one that they had to handle 
with the utmost care and foresight.13 
In the early days of the disaster, Hughes and Francis dealt with the realities that 
the very technology upon which all of society had come to depend for communication 
and organizational life was temporarily out of commission. As the waters rose, causing 
electricity outages, institutional and other computer servers became compromised,   
disrupting e-mail and Internet use, including reliance upon  institutional websites. 
Telephone service, including cell phones in cases where local transmitters or 
infrastructure were damaged, also became unreliable. However, from off-site locations 
these leaders and their staffs began to reestablish connections with their constituents, now 
widely spread out in different geographical locales. When use of these technologies and 
devices—telephones, computer services and instruments, web and Internet connections—
was restored, they became, even more important than in normal times, the glue that held 
things together.  This ability to regain a reliance on basic infra-structural needs in turn 
enabled these presidents and their staffs to engage in re-building and re-establishing 
community through critical communications and directions to students, staff, and faculty. 
Almost as quickly as Katrina wreaked its havoc, these presidents virtually 
seamlessly turned their attention to the monumental tasks ahead. As the significantly 
disrupted life of these institutions began the slow progress of returning from the impact of 
the storm’s surge while the waters began to recede, Francis and Hughes embarked on 
turning their attention to rebuilding.  Hogan likewise, though not facing problems to the 
degree of her counterparts in New Orleans, had to begin the process of addressing 
significant damage and partial destruction of many of Tougaloo’s buildings.  
The confluence of issues that the storm’s effects brought to the fore created 
further unprecedented leadership demands on these presidents as they began steps in 
recovery.  For example, because Hughes was so new to her position, there were members 
of her Board who thought she might want to vacate the presidency, thus leaving Dillard’s 
planning and rebounding to Board members, placing them in a most difficult position 




from which to recruit and attract a successor.14  Sensing this rumor, Hughes reacted 
quickly to assure the Board that she had felt literally called to the position of their 
president in the first place.  Now the storm and its aftermath served further to underscore 
and confirm her premonition that the choice to come to Dillard was indeed a “calling.”  
But this was only a precursor to the necessity to address the matter of the future of the 
university itself. 
In these early days, one of the possibilities facing Dillard was the prospect that the 
institution would either move elsewhere in the city or leave New Orleans altogether 
rather than trying to rebuild on site. Damage estimates, not completely known at this 
time, ended up being in the vicinity of 500-650 million dollars, many buildings totally 
destroyed and others so badly damaged that they likely would be eventually torn down.   
There were preliminary signals from the Board and elsewhere that it would be in 
the best interests of Dillard to re-establish itself elsewhere.  Hughes wanted the university 
to take off the table any thought about giving up on New Orleans as their home.15  Thus 
she proposed that the Board pass, which they did, a motion that they would rebuild in 
New Orleans, even if they did not know where, meaning remaining in the city even if it 
became impossible to return to the original site of the university for its 137 years as an 
institution.  Hughes believed an official stand confirming that Dillard would not leave 
New Orleans was critical for the community as well as other surrounding and interested 
parties. At the same time, her stand was a way for Hughes to maintain the focus of her 
Board and staff, as well as other Dillard stakeholders, on what the pathway was;  
considerations other than the goal of  returning to New Orleans would be  distractions 
from this mission. (It is clear from conversation with Hughes that she views this recovery 
and rebuilding as nothing less than a mission.)  Francis also reports that early discussions 
about Xavier’s future included the prospect that it would merge with Tulane, a step that 
would have significantly altered its tradition and position (especially as an HBCU).16 
The rebuilding process for Xavier and Dillard continues two years after Katrina.  
The immediate crises generated by the hurricane presented unprecedented challenges to 
these presidents.  But the longer-term problems, difficulties, and decisions have likewise 
tested their leadership, albeit in different ways. No longer are instantaneous and 
instinctive decisions and leadership wisdom the primary requirement.  Rather, to face the 
necessities of longer duration, reconstruction, and securing the future, these leaders must 
exert the ability to persist and to expend personal and institutional resources crucial to the 
tasks at hand and over what already is and will continue to be for the foreseeable future a 
very long-term process.    
From the outset of this phase, Hughes decided on a bold assertion and strategy.  It 
appears she hatched the idea personally and then navigated with her Board to garner 
support.  Her strategic view and stance are simple, yet profound: Dillard would not only 
come back, but that she and her colleagues would rebuild the campus and return the 
university to a standing even better as an institution than it had ever been.17  In a sense 
she took advantage of the opportunity of the disaster that had befallen Dillard to argue 
that buildings and facilities not only needed to be renovated or newly constructed, but 
that what replaced the old would result in more than a mere status quo. 
Dillard was fortunate to receive enormous assistance and aid from Brown 
University, whose president, Ruth Simmons, is a Dillard alumna. Brown was one of 




many colleges and universities to offer support and to assist the higher education 
institutions of New Orleans in temporarily placing students, many of whom transferred 
immediately for the fall semester, losing little if any time and course credit. But Brown, 
leveraging and collaborating with Princeton, provided further ongoing assistance to 
Dillard regarding facilities, long range planning, and other strategic support and technical 
capacity.   
Each of the three presidents featured here placed themselves at the nexus of their 
respective leadership teams.  As noted, there are great similarities in the leadership styles 
they utilized as they asserted command in the situations that were affecting their 
campuses. They relied either on existing and functioning presidential cabinets, capable of 
operating for emergency planning purposes, or they expanded these groups as needed to 
include other players who would be crucial in response and recovery efforts.  However, 
all three also delegated significant authority to staff colleagues in order that the full 
capacity of their institutions would be marshaled to cope with the crisis. Thus, while 
clearly in charge and exerting the authority of the presidency, these leaders are also 
sufficiently wise to know that the most effective and efficient way to lead, especially in 
the face of a crisis situation, is to use the expertise and ability of the other “leaders” of 
their campuses to the fullest extent possible. 
In addition to the reasonable set of skills and abilities that are viewed as essential 
to college presidents, the Katrina crisis has required both that these capabilities be applied 
to an extraordinary degree and that complementary training and experience also be 
brought to the fore. For example, President Francis notes that his legal background served 
him well “mostly because of training to be hard-nosed: what are the problems, what are 
the solutions?  How do you survive?”18 He adds, emphasizing the above-noted 
importance of delegation that “we thrived because we hired people smarter than us.  You 
give these people authority to make decisions in their areas.”   
But the theory that it may be good to delegate, particularly in crisis and urgent 
situations, is only good as far as it goes. Francis points out that much of the leadership 
capacity of these colleagues and staff was grounded in “the preparation of people who 
had the commitment to the institution.”  Here were his staff and crucial Xavier personnel 
living “in temporary quarters, but they worked passionately for the campus to get 
back.”19 To Francis, this passion is what made things work and enabled Xavier to respond 
and recover.  He points out the irony that the “school had the largest enrollment in its 
history in August 2005.”  Thus they had an enormous influx of students all of whom were 
“wondering when we would get back?”  Due to the yeoman efforts of Francis and his 
staff and faculty, seventy-six percent were eventually able to return to campus by the 
following January. The university developed plans so that these students (especially 
valuable to those who had not taken courses in the fall term after the hurricane) could 
complete an entire academic year of study compressed between January and August 
2006, the one year anniversary of the storm.  Thus they would be on course for the 2006-
2007 academic year.   
Asked what kept him going during this time, Francis replies that it was the simple 
fact that “he knew he had a great staff, and if there were any doubts [about that staff] 
Katrina erased them.”20 Such belief and confidence, confirmed by the crucible of an 
almost unimaginable crisis, are a platform on which most leaders would hope to be able 




to stand. For Francis, this grounding sustained him not only in the opening days of 
responding to what Katrina wrought on Xavier, but even more so during the longer-term 
work that continues with the effort to return the university to its full stature and vigor.  
Francis sums up the hard work his Xavier colleagues had put in during the first months: 
“When the lights came on at the campus, it was like a lighthouse,” adding, “This is a 
crisis, but we still have our lives so we will make this work.”21 
Underlying the concrete actions and steps these three presidents undertook to 
address the immediate and longer-term effects of Hurricane Katrina are the personal 
rudders and compasses that undergird them as leaders. These leadership characteristics do 
not readily lend themselves to be “taught” in any conventional sense. Revealed in the 
actions and words of these presidents is a combination of instinct, experience, beliefs and 
values, and, to some extent, the throwback word, “faith.” However, despite the 
uniqueness of the individual stories these presidents relate about what kept them going in 
the face of such disaster, the perspectives each constructed and the visions essential to 
enable their institutions and communities to rebound are a strikingly important feature of 
what we are able to learn from them. 
Though Tougaloo College was not as significantly affected as its colleague 
institutions to the south in New Orleans, the damage and upheaval to its campus were still 
profound. Placing into a broader context what she and her community faced, President 
Hogan reflects that they were presented with “a teachable moment for what much of the 
rest of the world has to cope with daily.”22 She also embraced and emphasized with her 
staff from the very first moments that Tougaloo’s students would “learn from us,” that is, 
the way the leadership of the college would be conducted would not be missed on the 
students.23 
Hogan claims that her most immediate response was a “feeling of helplessness.”  
The campus suffered significant damage, had no electricity, and “there was no way to just 
call to get power up and running.”24  This sense that there was much to do and that the 
restoration of basic services was not in Hogan’s immediate control became even more 
apparent as recovery from the storm progressed and the reality was that “there were 
places locally [such as a hospital] that needed things” much more than the campus.  As 
events and time unfolded, Hogan reports that she did receive “pressure from 
administrators” to try to use her and Tougaloo’s local influence in order to get campus 
power restored ahead of other institutions and areas of the city. Her argument is that 
morally and ethically “she simply could not do” this and at the same time maintain in any 
kind of good conscience.  Hogan views “these judgments,” that she had to make during 
the response and recovery as “testing her values and conscience.”   
Reflecting on the demands of dealing with such a cataclysmic event for her and 
her college community, Hogan reveals an internal journey of leadership guided by basic 
core principles. It is impossible, and outside the bounds of this inquiry, to know and to 
judge the extent to which the same core assumptions were at the basis of her presidency 
during “normal” times.  Further, it must be pointed out that she and her fellow presidents 
faced with this disaster did not construct a set of new values overnight.  However, Hogan 
connects them to her understanding of what took place in the face of this crisis time.  She 
reports finding herself continually thinking about the situation and what it meant.  One 




thing that was clear was the knowledge of “the things we did not have for this kind of 
disaster,” and that much of the world copes with such a paucity of resources all the time.  
In an effort to be highly visible and to support and work closely with her staff, 
Hogan was on campus during the bulk of each day, much of her time spent walking 
around the campus to survey damage and to consult directly with staff supervising clean 
up.  Early in the aftermath, while out on campus, Tougaloo’s safety and security and 
grounds directors told her that it was too dangerous to be personally on site. Shortly after, 
a tree fell near where she was standing, but with a hard hat, she continued to be side-by-
side with her staff engaged in the clean up. 
Each day began with an early morning meeting of the administrative group she 
convened to handle recovery and planning. One of the perplexing aspects of what she 
faced as a leader was the “awesome responsibility to have to have answers when you 
don’t.”  Staff were asking questions about what to do next, and Hogan had to grapple 
with a balance between the need “to exude calmness, motivation, assurance,” with the 
reality that she and her group would have to navigate the unknowns together.  She simply 
did not have all the answers, or lacked sufficient information from which to develop 
them. Thus Hogan was required to operate on instinct and the best sense of how to 
proceed without the normally desirable level of knowledge and ability needed reasonably 
to predict the course that events would take.  
Hogan underscores the experience of her fellow presidents that in confronting a 
crisis such as this there is “no script. You do lead and act by instinct.”  Nothing was more 
revelatory than the basic principle of leadership highlighted by the hurricane: “There is 
no job that my colleagues might have to do that is beneath me.”  Thus, even when college 
safety and security and other buildings and grounds personnel urged her not to perform 
particular actions, she persisted by physically being on campus. 
Hogan concludes her reflections about the meanings inherent in the entire episode 
by shifting to an even deeper core underlying her leadership.  First, she sets the recovery 
in the context noted above that in a sense this was learning and a teaching opportunity for 
everyone. Students would see how the adults around them reacted and functioned.  But 
also Hogan and her staff had to be prepared to learn a great deal themselves. Second, 
even in the crisis she was able to connect what was ahead to continuing aspirations for 
Tougaloo. She captures this connection between the present crisis and the path through it 
by saying, “We are about the creation of future and we do this every day.”  Thus what 
should be different about the tasks ahead in recovering from this natural disaster or any 
similar unanticipated calamity? The future that now had to be created was urgent and 
possibly more tangible, but it remained nonetheless connected to the normal mission of 
the college: the “creation of the future.” 
Last, she indicates the obvious but often overlooked, notion that “as a leader you 
have to be prepared to take charge.”  Hogan would argue that she did this primarily based 
on instinct.  But then delving a bit more into the basis of her instinct, Hogan suggests: 
“At your center you have to have faith,” which she defines as “something that helps 
assure that you are not piloting the ship.”  She assumes a philosophical posture that on 
one hand may appear naïve, but on the other may be at the core of how a leader leads: 
“You know that it will be okay. That you will work to do the right thing. And it will 
come out okay.”  These comments allude in Hogan’s case to her faith and belief in some 




“higher power” (though not describing this as God, she implies this to be the case).  
Drawing these elements together, she concludes, noting, “Leadership traits and 
spirituality are [the two qualities] that inform your style.”     
As Tougaloo students returned to campus, only weeks after first being evacuated, 
Hogan strongly urged them to volunteer in the local community to assist in the continuing 
recovery and rebuilding efforts. Exerting leadership to encourage students to be of 
service to the neighborhoods and city of Jackson is further evidence of Hogan’s notion 
that the entire crisis presented learning opportunities and a teachable moment for all 
concerned. Hughes initiated a similar program at Dillard when students were able to 
return to campus. She wanted the university to be part of the recovery, so students 
became involved in service endeavors, service learning, and research projects. The 
capacity of these schools to affirm relationships to their communities, truly to emphasize 
“town-gown” relationships, has been one of the salutary and broadly educational stories 
connected to the Katrina recovery: students from local colleges and universities, 
complemented by contingents of fellow undergraduates from around the nation, along 
with other volunteers reaching out to the community. Those who especially benefitted 
from these students serving those in need were individuals, mainly the most poor New 
Orleans citizens, struggling against great financial and other constraints in efforts to 
return to their residences and livelihoods.   
Like Hogan, Hughes also reflects about what she learned about herself through 
the initial days and months, extending to two years, of coping with the presidential 
leadership challenges of a campus completely inundated by water and having its future 
threatened by the ravages of the storm. Hughes comments that she “had had a lot of 
career experience, but it was moving through hoops,” the traditional career trek through 
upward positions of increasing responsibility, first in academic administration and then to 
two presidencies. However, she underscores that confronting the Katrina damage “was 
different because of the purpose” and it was these stakes, resurrecting Dillard from a very 
possible demise, that Hughes came to see as a situation in which she “is working from a 
different base of strength and that is the thing that makes her move forward.”25 
As a coda to these presidential reflections, Francis reiterates the larger picture that 
was revealed in the face of this crisis. His reflection is an important reminder to those 
who oversee and protect the gates of the academy on a day in and day out basis, but can 
be easily forgotten in normal times in which the challenges are more de rigueur.  Francis 
says that as he and his staff assessed what they were facing, he came to the conclusion 
that “the goal was sacred, and that goal was to get back, and to get back for the 
students.”26  When the Xavier students were able to return to campus, Francis spoke to 
them at a reopening convocation. His message was simple: “The university and the 
students had overcome a major crisis,” and in response fellow “students from all over the 
country are coming to help.”27 
There are many lessons about leadership to be drawn from the experience of these 
three presidents and their colleges and universities as they faced the realities, fallout, and 
long road of recovery Hurricane Katrina caused. First, leaders are expected to move 
immediately to the fore, to direct the actions of their staff and community members.  
They may be forced by the circumstances and the rapid unfolding of events to perform 
much of this leadership and management in an instinctual manner. In doing so they 




should, as they appear to in this case, follow the advice that has guided organizations, 
such as NASA in the midst of crises such Apollo 13: If you do not know what to do, do 
not do anything.  But Hogan, Francis, and Hughes moved forward systematically, though 
at times probably lurching in directions out of necessity, in order to utter the decisions 
that had to be made; they had to provide direction while permitting sufficient autonomy 
through broad delegation to their direct cabinet and emergency team administrators.  
Also, as Hogan points out, there are times, maybe especially in crises, that leaders may 
not have all the answers and they need both to acknowledge that (at least to themselves) 
and yet still continue to plot courses of actions.  
Second, these presidents responded to ensure that people were the priority and 
that these community members had to be enabled to be as safe and secure as possible.  A 
combination of instinctive responses, especially directed toward the students in their care, 
coupled with foresight and some degree of pre-planning (e.g., Xavier’s emergency 
procedures and information sources for such occasions), and probably a bit of good 
fortune resulted in this task being carried out in as timely, safe (no lives lost), and orderly 
a fashion as could be humanly imagined under the circumstances. 
Next, in very rapid order these leaders turned attention to the recovery and 
rebuilding stage facing their campuses. Their adjusted time lines and goals for when their 
institutions would re-open (much less a problem for Tougaloo given the relatively less 
extensive damage suffered than Xavier and Dillard) had to be pushed into much more 
distant futures.  In the meantime all efforts were expended to ensure that students would 
be able to continue their educations at other institutions and to compress their work upon 
their return.   
Another challenge that had to be faced was the degree to which communication is 
crucial in keeping communities of people—students, faculty, administrators, staff, and 
other stakeholders such as alumni and key funding sources—together.  In normal times 
these constituents would have regular contact with each other, often in person, as a bond 
uniting them.  The fact that these colleges and universities were able to hold together, that 
the presidents were able to apply the glue essential in bonding their constituents was a 
critical step in the human recovery and in the capacity for everyone to take the first steps 
on the road back and to envision the day of their return.   
Meanwhile, Hughes, Francis, and Hogan exerted leadership dedicated to the 
tedious process of dealing with contractors, lawyers, insurance providers, and local 
authorities. This phase continues to the present time and likely will for the foreseeable 
future. In this case the matter of extent of how Dillard and Xavier will return to the 
previous or an even improved state has yet to be realized.  However, it is clear that 
Presidents Hughes and Francis are of a mind to settle for nothing less than seeing their 
institutions once again whole and positioned even more strongly than in the pre-Katrina 
days. 
Lastly, and most importantly in terms of its contribution to what we know and 
believe about leaders and leadership, are the stories of the internal journey that Katrina 
created for these presidents. These presidents are individuals, maybe unique but maybe 
less so than might first be thought, who appear deeply religious in the broad sense and 
who view their faith and beliefs having been put to the test by the crises they were forced 
to navigate. Their words convey notions about the sacredness of their task; a firm belief 




about the transcendent importance of creating and shaping the education of students; and 
an intent to both draw meaning from present travails and to envision that meaning as a 
sustaining force in the unknowns of rebuilding and recovery. They add to these values the 
humbling understanding that while you are taking charge as a leader, the situation you 
face is not completely in your control and that you are therefore functioning in light of 
more transcendent forces and powers. This grounding supports the aspirations each has 
developed that there could be an even strengthened and brighter future.  
To substantiate this contention about the role of faith and belief in the compass 
and rudder of any leader requires a more thorough exploration of these or other leaders 
facing similar crisis circumstances.  But a provisional conclusion can be drawn that belief 
in larger power(s) and in a view that plights be understood in a broad, possibly 
transcendent context, not unlike that of prophets and those of faith, was in the minds of 
these presidents and appears to have sustained them. 
Hurricane Katrina created for these presidents a nearly unprecedented 
confrontation with threats and challenges to the very foundations of their institutions, of 
the education offered to their students, and of the employment and professional prospects 
of faculty, administrators, staff, and other employees.  As were described in these 
interviews their journeys shed light on how leaders cope with such demands and how 
they sort through the choices facing them. Much of what they share cannot be “taught” in 
any conventional sense. However, as with all college and university presidents, these 
three had to bring to bear their own combinations of experience, instinct, and sound 
judgment  in order to size up  and address  the tasks they faced.   
We cannot always be certain that leaders in positions who encounter such 
circumstances will lead in sound fashion. The hope and expectations about their 
appointments are always that they will be able to provide well-grounded leadership 
especially in such crucibles. In this instance, Hughes, Francis, and Hogan met the 
challenges of their day and respectively to Dillard, Xavier, and Tougaloo in ways that 
guided their campus communities well and that hold lessons for those interested in the 








                                                     
1  These three schools are also members of the Leadership Alliance, headquartered at Brown University.  
The Alliance was founded over fifteen years ago in the early 1990s with a purpose and mission to increase 
the numbers of minorities entering academic fields for the Ph.D. and other advanced degrees and the 
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2 Telephone interviews were conducted with these three presidents on the dates indicated for each. 
3 Beverly Hogan, President, Tougaloo College, interview with author, July 20, 2006. 
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that follows is taken from this interview. 
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12 Ibid.  One of the unfortunate realities that Dillard and likely other institutions continue to deal with now 
almost two years after the hurricane is debate and litigation with their insurers about fair compensation for 
losses suffered.  The dilemma is that of reimbursement at the value of the property versus the cost to 
replace the facilities.    
13 One of the positive stories to evolve from the diaspora of students from New Orleans’ campuses in the 
wake of Katrina is the cooperative relationship that instantly developed between institutions there and their 
counterparts who temporarily took in students so they could continue their educations, but with provisos 
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14 Personal conversation with President Hughes, May 26, 2007. 
15 Hughes interview. 
16 Francis interview.  HBCU’s are Historically Black Colleges and Universities. 
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